Título: Value as part of reality : an internal realist response to non-cognitivism in ethics
Autores: François, Any Marie-Gérard
Fecha: 1991
Publicador: McGill University - MCGILL
Fuente:
Tipo: Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Tema: Knowledge, Theory of
Ethics, Modern -- 20th century
Realism
Descripción: The possibility of considering the ethical domain as cognitive is a principal concern of contemporary moral philosophy. Following an analysis of Hilary Putnam's internal realism, I discuss how our usual conceptions of truth and factuality should be modified in order to render philosophical discourse free of the fact/value distinction. I then present a response to Gilbert Harman's argument for non-cognitivism in ethics and argue that, within an internal realism that incorporates such modified conceptions, the non-cognitive argument no longer carriers any weight.
Idioma: en