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Título: The problem of the external world : a fallibilist vindication of our claim to knowledge
Autores: Jung, Darryl
Fecha: 1989
Publicador: McGill University - MCGILL
Fuente:
Tipo: Electronic Thesis or Dissertation
Tema: Perception (Philosophy)
Knowledge, Theory of
Descripción: The celebrated 'veil-of-ideas' argument is a skeptical argument that moves from a certain epistemological doctrine about perception to a general negative conclusion concerning our thoughts about external material objects. Indeed, the argument concludes not only that we do not know, but that neither could we know nor even reasonably believe, any of the thoughts that we may possibly entertain concerning external material objects. The epistemological doctrine about perception referred to in the argument has been in fashion since Descartes and states that the nature of perceptual knowledge in general is inferential.
In this thesis, we will attempt to defuse this argument by calling into question the epistemological doctrine upon which it relies. This method of defusing the argument appeals to some of the reasoning to be found in the writings of J. L. Austin and, more recently, John McDowell. The following is a rough outline of how we will proceed. First, we will briefly look at the skeptical argument in question. Second, we will examine the mainstay of the epistemological doctrine, the Argument from Illusion, and argue that without the appeal to a certain view about the nature of appearance, this argument is ineffective. Third, we will adduce reasons for rejecting this view of appearance and put forward an alternative. This alternative requires us to construe knowledge in fallibilist rather than infallibilist terms. Thus, finally, we will examine the fallibilist and infallibilist conceptions of knowledge.
Idioma: en