Título: Single-basined choice
Autores: BOSSERT, Walter
PETERS, Hans
Fecha: 2013-08-21
2013-08-21
2013-06-03
Publicador: Université de Montreal
Fuente:
Tipo: [Autre / Other]
Tema: Single-basinedness
Choice correspondences
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Upper semicontinuity
Suzumura consistency
Descripción: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequenes of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent. Journal of Economic Literature.
Idioma: Inglés