| Título: | Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia. |
| Autores: |
Al, C. Arcand, J.L. Ethier, F. |
| Fecha: |
2008-01-24 2008-01-24 1996 |
| Publicador: | Université de Montreal |
| Fuente: |
 |
| Tipo: | Article |
| Tema: |
[JEL:D80] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - General [JEL:Q10] Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - Agriculture - General [JEL:D80] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Généralités [JEL:Q10] Agriculture et économie des ressources naturelles - Agriculture - Généralités |
| Descripción: | In the presence of moral hazard, received agency theory predicts the Marshallian inefficiency of agricultural tenancy contracts, meaning that inputs per hectare on sharecropped land will differ from that on owned land. in this paper, we test for the presence of Marshallian inefficiency using a unique data set collected in the Tunisian village of El Oulja in 1993. |
| Idioma: | No aplica |
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