Título: Contentious Contracts
Autores: HEGE, Ulrich
VIALA, Pascale
Fecha: 2008-01-24
2008-01-24
1997
Publicador: Université de Montreal
Fuente:
Tipo: Article
Tema: [JEL:D82] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Asymmetric and Private Information
[JEL:K12] Law and Economics - Basic Areas of Law - Contract Law
[JEL:D82] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Information privée et asymétrique
[JEL:K12] Droit et économie - Les domaines du droit - Droit des contrats
Descripción: This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.
Idioma: No aplica