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Título: In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets
Autores: EHLERS, Lars
Fecha: 2006-09-22
2006-09-22
2003
Publicador: Université de Montreal
Fuente:
Tipo: Article
Tema: Matching Market
Incomplete Information
[JEL:C78] Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
[JEL:D81] Microeconomics - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
[JEL:J44] Labor and Demographic Economics - Particular Labor Markets - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
[JEL:C78] Mathématiques et méthodes quantitatives - Théorie des jeux et négociation - Théorie de la négociation et du "matching"
[JEL:D81] Microéconomie - Information et incertain - Critères de prise de décision sous le risque et l'incertain
[JEL:J44] Démographie et économie du travail - Marchés particuliers de travail - Marché du travail pour les professionnels
Descripción: We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.
Idioma: No aplica