- Inicio
- Atrás
|
Título: |
Testing for Hidden Information and Action in Automobile Insurance Market |
Autores: |
García Rubiano, Juan Pablo |
Fecha: |
2009-12-01 |
Publicador: |
Universidad del Rosario, Colombia |
Fuente: |
|
Tipo: |
masterThesis |
Tema: |
Insurance Adverse selection Moral hazard Empirical tests of contract theory SEGUROS DE AUTOMOVILES SEGUROS DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL POLIZAS DE SEGUROS DE AUTOMOVILES ECONOMIA Insurance Adverse selection Moral hazard Empirical tests of contract theory |
Descripción: |
I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market
using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information
I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s
risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded
from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s
traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies
for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop
a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus
experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with
previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification
of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time
spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim
and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity
that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard
in the Colombian insurance market. I test the presence of hidden information and action in the automobile insurance market
using a data set from several Colombian insurers. To identify the presence of hidden information
I find a common knowledge variable providing information on policyholder s
risk type which is related to both experienced risk and insurance demand and that was excluded
from the pricing mechanism. Such unused variable is the record of policyholder s
traffic offenses. I find evidence of adverse selection in six of the nine insurance companies
for which the test is performed. From the point of view of hidden action I develop
a dynamic model of effort in accident prevention given an insurance contract with bonus
experience rating scheme and I show that individual accident probability decreases with
previous accidents. This result brings a testable implication for the empirical identification
of hidden action and based on that result I estimate an econometric model of the time
spans between the purchase of the insurance and the first claim, between the first claim
and the second one, and so on. I find strong evidence on the existence of unobserved heterogeneity
that deceives the testable implication. Once the unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled, I find conclusive statistical grounds supporting the presence of moral hazard
in the Colombian insurance market. |
Idioma: |
Español |