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Título: Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?
Autores: Drazen, Allan
Alesina, Alberto
Fecha: 2010-11-09
1988
2010-11-09
Publicador: American Economic Association
Fuente: Ver documento
Tipo: Journal Article
Tema:
Descripción: When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a "war of attrition," each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. We motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes.
Economics
Idioma: Inglés
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