Título: | Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? |
Autores: |
Drazen, Allan Alesina, Alberto |
Fecha: |
2010-11-09 1988 2010-11-09 |
Publicador: | American Economic Association |
Fuente: |
Ver documento |
Tipo: | Journal Article |
Tema: | |
Descripción: |
When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a "war of attrition," each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. We motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes. Economics |
Idioma: | Inglés |
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