| Título: | Network Markets and Consumer Coordination |
| Autores: |
Ambrus, Attila Argenziano, Rossella |
| Fecha: | 2004 |
| Publicador: | Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, IEHAS Discussion Papers 0423 |
| Fuente: | |
| Tipo: |
Monograph NonPeerReviewed |
| Tema: | HB Economic Theory |
| Descripción: | This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A monopolist might operate multiple ex ante identical networks to price differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the market. Firms can obtain positive profits in price competition. Product differentiation in equilibrium is endogenized by consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria. |
| Idioma: | No aplica |