| Título: | Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation |
| Autores: |
Van Vugt, Mark Henrich, Joseph O'Gorman, Rick |
| Fecha: | 2009-01 |
| Publicador: | |
| Fuente: |
Ver documento |
| Tipo: |
Article PeerReviewed |
| Tema: | BF Psychology |
| Descripción: | Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically. |
| Idioma: | No aplica |