L
Título: Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents: Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System
Autores: Stephenson, Matthew Caleb
Jackson, Howell Edmunds
Fecha: 2013-06-28
2010
2013-06-28
Publicador: Harvard University, Harvard Law School
Fuente: Ver documento
Tipo: Journal Article
Tema:
Descripción: Interest group pluralism presumes that public policy outcomes are determined principally through a contest for influence among organized pressure groups. Most interest groups, however, do not represent themselves in this process. Rather, they rely on professional lobbyists for representation, information, and advice. These lobbyists are agents with their own interests, and these interests may not align perfectly with those of their clients. This essay outlines this principal-agent problem and sketches its possible implications for policy outcomes. In particular, we hypothesize that the lobbyist-client agency problem may bias policy in favor of small homogeneous groups, may exacerbate status quo bias and lead to excessive attention to symbolic issues, may promote expansive delegations to administrative agencies, and may impede systematic reforms to the policy-making process.
Idioma: Inglés
Artículos similares:
Semantic-head-driven generation por Moore, Robert C.,Pereira, Fernando C. N.,van Noord, Gertjan,Shieber, Stuart
Ellipsis and higher-order unification por Pereira, Fernando C. N.,Dalrymple, Mary,Shieber, Stuart
Automatic yellow-pages pagination and layout por Marks, Joe,Shieber, Stuart,Johari, Ramesh,Partovi, Ali
Generation and synchronous tree-adjoining grammars por Shieber, Stuart,Schabes, Yves
An algorithm for generating quantifier scopings por Hobbs, Jerry,Shieber, Stuart
10