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Título: Team Formation in a Network
Autores: Kinateder, Markus
Fecha: 2009-06-03
2009-06-03
2009
Publicador: AgEcon
Fuente:
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Tema: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation
Imperfect Information
Institutional and Behavioral Economics
C72
C73
D85
Descripción: Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare.
Idioma: en