| Título: | CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION |
| Autores: | Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. |
| Fecha: |
1998-04-29 2007-03-07 1998-04-29 2007-03-07 1995 |
| Publicador: | AgEcon |
| Fuente: |
 |
| Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper |
| Tema: |
environmental regulation tax dynamic game Environmental Economics and Policy Q25 H32 D62 |
| Descripción: | I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics |
| Idioma: |
English en |
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